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Constructing the Secular: The Changing Relationship
Between Religion and Politics in the Tibetan Exile
Community
Emmi Okada

This paper investigates the construction of
secularity in the Tibetan exile community
by examining the unfolding process of
secularization, as well as the emergence of an
ideology of secularism and secular democracy.
I consider secularization in the exile society to
be occurring in two respects. The first is in the
form of differentiation between the political
and religious institutions, which culminated in
the Dalai Lama’s complete devolution of his
political powers to the elected government
in 2011. The second is in the sense of the
transfer and transition of political legitimacy
from the Dalai Lama, who holds traditionalcharismatic authority, to the elected leadership
in exile, particularly the current lay prime
minister whose political authority lies more
in democratic and legal-rational legitimacy.
Secularism is understood here as a politicalphilosophical ideology to be distinguished from
the socio-political process of secularization.

In the exile context, the term ‘secularism’
is translated as chöluk rimé (chos lugs
ris med)—a neologism whose key lexical
constituent rimé alludes to a much older
Tibetan tradition of ‘non-sectarianism.’
This paper claims that a unique Tibetan
secularism that upholds religious pluralism
is under construction in order to negotiate
the exigencies of political modernity, the
preservation of Tibetan identity and unity, and
the struggle against China. I analyze key events
which occurred in exile in 2011—the Dalai
Lama’s political retirement and the election
of a lay prime minister—and argue that a
shift t wards secular democracy is taking
place, where the basis of political legitimacy is
transitioning from the sovereignty of the Dalai
Lama as a Bodhisatt a-King to one grounded in
popular sovereignty.
Keywords: Secularism, secularization, Dalai Lama, devolution,
democratization, Lobsang Sangay, political legitimacy, Tibetan
exile politics, Central Tibetan Administration (CTA).
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Introduction
The Dalai Lama is today a vocal and ardent advocate of
secularism. As paradoxical as this may seem, coming from
a foremost Tibetan lama clad in Buddhist robes, the Dalai
Lama explains his position in his most recent English
book Beyond Religion: Ethics for a Whole World (2012). Here,
he develops his case for a ‘secular ethics’ that upholds
cherished human values common to, but not exclusively
sourced in, individual religions. This work is intended as
a sequel to Ancient Wisdom, Modern World: Ethics for the New
Millennium (1999). In Beyond Religion, he continues to build
his argument for a universal ethics which has spiritual
underpinnings but which nevertheless sheds the language
of a particular religion so that the ideas can be accepted by
those of different faiths and those who follow no organized
religion. While a patent continuity exists between the two
works, the emphasis in the Dalai Lama’s latest volume is on
the ‘secular’ nature of his proposed ethics.
Apart from this latest intellectual direction by the spiritual
leader, in recent years two other salient developments in
the Tibetan exile-polity relating to the ‘secular’ have taken
place. The first is the Dalai Lama’s decision in March 2011
to devolve his political powers completely to the elected
leadership in exile. This move marked a historic break
from the traditional form of Tibetan government (the Ganden Phodrang) where successive Dalai Lama incarnations
have jointly held religious and temporal authority since
the seventeenth century. The second is the prime-ministerial elections that occurred that same year, which
saw for the first time in Tibetan history a democratically
elected lay leader to the highest executive office of the
Tibetan exile government. Do these political developments
have anything to do with the philosophical articulation
of ‘secular ethics’ by the Dalai Lama? Certainly no explicit
linkage has been made. However, I argue that the intellectual and political developments described above are part
of a broader process taking place in the exile society to
construct the ‘secular.’
Research on non-Western secularism(s) is still an emerging
area, but there is growing acknowledgement that these
must be studied on their own terms and not through the
theoretical prisms of Western secularity (Bubandt and
Beek 2012; Bhargava 1998, 2010b; Madan 1997; van der
Veer 2001; Warner, VanAntwerpen, and Calhoun 2010;
McBrien and Pelkmans 2008). Talal Asad noted “although
religion is regarded as alien to the secular, the latter is
also seen to have generated religion” (2003: 193). That is,
in configuring the secular, the religious is also reinvented
as a social category. The ‘secular,’ therefore, is much more
than ‘religion’s other’ (Cady and Hurd 2010: 12) and should

be seen as a ‘presence,’ rather than the totality of reality
that is left behind when religion is subtracted (Taylor 2007;
Calhoun, Juergensmeyer, and VanAntwerpen 2011: 5). Recent literature takes these insights as a point of departure,
acknowledging the mutual borrowings, constitutions and
transformations that occur between the religious and the
secular (Starrett 2010: 642; Van der Veer 2011: 271; Cady
and Hurd 2010: 5; Göle, 2010: 46).
This paper investigates the construction of secularity
in the Tibetan exile polity and, in doing so, explores the
mutual transformations of the ‘secular’ and ‘religious’
domains, especially within English-language discourse
aimed for an international audience. I understand the
construction of secularity—that is, both secularization and
secularism—as a form of political development by Tibetan
exiles. It is an initiative to achieve modernity in the political sphere through the use of their own referents, such as
the reinvention of the term chöluk rimé (chos lugs ris med)
discussed below. And yet this Tibetan construction of secularity is very much part of an appeal to the international
community and their host country India, whom exiled
Tibetans rely on for financial, moral and other kinds of
support (see Frechette 2002 for a study of these dynamics
in Nepal). I say this process is ‘constructed’ because, while
there is a degree of historical contingency to any social
phenomenon, the events mentioned above reveal a high
level of agency and conscious effort by the Dalai Lama and
the exile leadership to refashion the relationship between
the political and the religious. I conducted the research on
which this article is based from June to September 2012
in Dharamsala, India, the seat of the Tibetan exile government, in the wake of these dramatic developments.1
For my purpose, I shall employ the term ‘secularization’ in
two ways. First, drawing on Casanova (1994; 2011) I adopt
his definition of one type of secularization as institutio al differentiation of the secular spheres (state, economy,
science and so on) from religious institutions. Within this
process, I place special emphasis on the differentiation
between the institution of the Dalai Lama and the exile
government, the culmination of which is the complete
devolution in 2011 of the temporal powers that had been
hitherto vested in the institution of the Dalai Lama.2 The
other two types of secularization identified by Casanova
are the decline of religious belief and practices, and the
privatization of religion, processes which I do not believe
are taking place among the Tibetan exile community. Secularization in the first sense is similar to the understan ing of Karmay (2008) who asserted that “separation of
church and state does not imply abandoning the practices
of the established region . . . [but rather] secures freedom
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of religious exercise and therefore the right of personal
choice.” This form of secularization ensures the neutrality
of the state as well as freedom from sectarianism and religious domination. The second sense in which I employ the
term ‘secularization’ is to denote the transfer and transition of political legitimacy3 from the Dalai Lama, a representative of Weberian traditional-charismatic authority,
to the elected leadership in exile, especially the elected
prime minister, the basis of whose political authority lies
more in democratic and legal-rational legitimacy. ‘Secular’
and ‘secularity’ are employed in this article as aggregate
epistemic terms referring to both secularization and secularism. I use ‘secularism’ (as opposed to ‘secularization’) to
refer to the emic understanding of the political-philosophical ideology concerning the ‘secular.’ I will refrain from
turning to academic definitions of secularism because I am
more interested to see how the Tibetans themselves use
this term and what meaning they give it.
The Tibetan neologism coined in exile to translate ‘secularism’ is chöluk rimé. This is the established rendition of
the English word as translated in the widely-used Monlam
dictionary (see The New English-Tibetan Dictionary 2000) as
well as the term which is in currency in political circles in
exile. Chöluk rimé, however, carries distinct connotations
to indicate how the Tibetans understand secularism, for
its literal meaning is ‘non-sectarianism’ or ‘non-discrimination among religions.’ Thus, rather than a denial of
religion, secularism in exile is in fact affirmative of religion
and religious diversity, similar to the interpretation of
secularism found in India, which has influenced this co munity. The very lexical rendering of secularism by the
Tibetan diaspora suggests a different interpretive trajectory to its Western counterparts. I aim to shed light on the
way in which both secularization and secularism are being
constructed in exile in a uniquely Tibetan way so as to negotiate the exigencies of political modernity, the preservation of Tibetan identity, and the struggle against China.
The present study is by-and-large an analysis of the
English language discourse on the secular that has been
evolving since the commencement of democratization in
exile; it is not a detailed analysis of the Tibetan-language
debates. Both democratization and secularization are
bound up with the exile Tibetans’ international campaign,
and as the Dalai Lama’s English language publication of
Beyond Religion suggests, these political processes occurring
in Dharamsala are part of a rhetoric that intends to reach a
global audience. The focus, therefore, is on the pronouncements of the political leaders and civil society organizations in exile—both of which are highly conscious of the
international ramifications of their internal politics.
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This paper is divided broadly into two sections, focusing
on the socio-political process of secularization in the two
senses indicated above. The emergence of a secular ideology in exile will be discussed in the first section and the rise
of secular democracy in the second.
Secularization as Institutional Differentiation
Although a conceptual distinction between the spiritual
and the temporal existed among Tibetans prior to 1959
(see Dreyfus 1995; Ruegg 2003, 2004), it was only in exile
that a deliberate effort was made to separate the ‘religious’
and ‘secular’ spheres institutionally as part of an effort to
achieve—and project—political modernity. What might be
described as the signs of secularization in the exile society
in India is concomitant with the democratization process
that has been in motion since 1959 when the Dalai Lama
left Tibet for exile in India. Yet this process of differentiation between the religious and secular spheres does
not necessarily equate to a decline of religious influence.
In this section, I detail some of the main features of this
complex project of secularization, looking in particular at
the devolution of the political authority of the office of the
Dalai Lama; the delineations as well as the continuing linkages between religion and politics; and Buddhist principles
informing government institutions in exile.
In India, the fourteenth Dalai Lama found fertile ground on
which to build the institutions and processes of political
modernity, for there was an intrinsic equalizing dynamic
that operated in the shared experience of exile that served
to shift many old hierarchies (Roemer 2008: 69, 91-92).
After the Dalai Lama’s escape to India in 1959 in the wake
of the National Uprising in Tibet, some 80,000 Tibetan refugees followed him to India. That same year he established
the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA)—what was to
become known as the Tibetan ‘government-in-exile’—and
the following year created a parliament which represented
the three Tibetan provinces (Ü-Tsang, Kham, and Amdo)
and four major Tibetan Buddhist schools (Sakya, Nyingma,
Kagyu, Geluk). The religious representation is a unique
feature of the exile parliament and a means by which the
concerns of the sizeable Tibetan monastic community are
voiced in a political forum. The Tibetan indigenous religion
of Bön was added to the parliamentary religious representation in 1977, and regional representatives from Europe
and North America were included since the 1990s to
reflect the changing demographics of the Tibetan diaspora
(TCHRD 2012: 23, 26).
The Dalai Lama’s devolution of his political authority in
exile has taken place in three main stages. The major parliamentary restructuring in 1990-1991 represented the first

significant devolution of his temporal powers. This ended
the custom of the successive Dalai Lamas’ appointment of
cabinet members in favor of selection by the parliament.
The Tibetan leader also renounced his authority to endorse
the elected parliamentary deputies. The second stage of his
devolution took shape through the introduction of prime
ministerial elections in 2001 and included his self-declared ‘semi-retirement’ in 2003. Until then, the members
of the cabinet had elected one among themselves as the
prime minister for a term of one year (Tibetan Bulletin
Sept-Oct 2001: 5). The new change meant that the people
would directly elect the prime minister, who would then
choose his cabinet ministers subject to approval by the
parliament. In 2003 the Dalai Lama decided to devolve the
majority of his substantive administrative responsibilities;
from this point on, he began to refer to himself as being in
‘semi-retirement,’ retaining only a handful of duties as the
head-of-state.4 This second stage of devolution involved a
major transfer of responsibility from the Dalai Lama to the
elected prime minister, the exile parliament and the CTA
offices, including the power to appoint the justice commi sioners, the heads of statutory bodies and the ambassadors
of the foreign Tibet Offices Tibetan Review October 2003:
13). It also took away the Dalai Lama’s control over the
civil service and his right to approve major government
decisions (Lobsang Sangay 2010: 210).
In the third stage, a decade after the inauguration of direct
prime ministerial elections, the Dalai Lama decided to
completely devolve his temporal powers in March 2011,
signaling the culmination of his efforts to democratize
the Tibetan polity. Despite protestations and proposals of
alternatives, he refused to retain even a ceremonial role as
head-of-state (Tibetan Review June 2011b: 6). Today, the only
mention of the Dalai Lama in the Charter of the Tibetans-inExile is in Article 1, which recognizes him as the ‘Protector
and Symbol of Tibet and Tibetan People’ and assigns to him
purely advisory roles, which are not binding on the elected
leadership (see Tibetan Review July 2011c: 10).
Although the Dalai Lama’s devolution had proceeded in a
stepwise manner over the decades, with ten-year intervals between each major reform, his full retirement from
politics in 2011 nevertheless marked a radical departure.
It ended a 369-year-old practice of vesting both spiritual
and temporal authority in the Dalai Lama (CTA 2011: 19;
Tibetan Review July 2011c: 10). The fourteenth Dalai Lama
has told the Tibetans that the Ganden Phodrang will still
exist as his monastic estate but that its relationship with
politics has come to an end.5 In other words, ‘Ganden
Phodrang’ which was the name given to the Lhasa government in 1642, where successive Dalai Lamas had reigned as

a cakravartin6 (wheel-turner) or Bodhisattva-King, would
now refer solely to the religious institution and estate of
the Dalai Lama.7
In his speeches in March 2011, the Dalai Lama explained
that it is in the Tibetans’ interest to “establish a sound
system of governance” based on democratic principles and
self-reliance while he remained able and healthy and could
still “help resolve problems if called upon to do so” (CTA
2011: 17). His chief concern appeared to be the avoidance
of a situation of unpreparedness when the time comes for
him to pass away:
So the system of one-man rule is not good. Therefore it is not at all good if the Dalai Lama keeps on
holding ultimate power….The system [of the dual
authority of the Dalai Lama] has brought many
benefits since [the time of the fifth Dalai Lama]. Bu
now as we are in the 21st century, sooner or later
the time for change is imminent. But if the change
comes under the pressure of another person then
it will be a disgrace to the former Dalai Lamas... As
I am the fourteenth in line of that institution, it is
most appropriate if I on my own initiative, happily
and with pride, end the dual authority of the Dalai
Lama. Nobody except me can make this decision
and I have made the final decision (CTA 2011: 20
21).
The system of the dual authority of the Dalai Lama is
integral to the idea of chösi sungdrel (chos srid zung ‘brel),
commonly translated as the ‘union of religion and politics.’ It is clear from the above statement that the current
Dalai Lama views this system as anachronistic and believes
that he should bring about its reform as the incumbent of
that position. His speeches in March 2011 were delivered
in Tibetan, but they were subsequently translated into
English by the CTA and published in booklets for distribution. It can be inferred that while the reform was obviously
an initiative for the political development of the Tibetan
exile population, it was also carried out with an eye on the
broader international community, which has been supportive of the CTA’s democratization efforts.
Due to the paramount moral authority the Dalai Lama
holds among the Tibetans, his decision to devolve his political authority elicited a strong emotional response from
the exile community. A foreign visitor who was present at
the time of the Dalai Lama’s announcement on 10 March
2011 (the anniversary of the 1959 Tibetan uprising against
Chinese occupation of Tibet) described the reaction of
the Tibetans in terms of a paroxysm of lamentation, with
many Tibetans, especially of the older generation, break-
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ing down in tears as they received the news.8 Rejecting
implorations from the exile parliament and other sections
of society that he reconsider his decision, the Dalai Lama
insisted that his “decision is final” (CTA 2011: 21) and he
flatly declined the proposal to retain a ceremonial position
as the head-of-state, similar to the position of a monarch
in a constitutional monarchy (Tibetan Review June 2011b: 6).

public inspection [seem] problematic” (Lobsang Sangay
2010: 297). The influence of religion in the exile admi istration can also be found in other unexpected areas.
For example, in a recent defamation case heard by the
Supreme Justice Commission (SJC), the losing party was
ordered, among other things, to make amends by offering
a certain number of butter lamps at the monastery.12

Despite the initial resistance of the Tibetans to let their
leader retire from politics, from my field research a year
after the Dalai Lama’s historic relinquishment of his temporal powers, the general view towards his decision appeared to be one of acceptance. For example, the President
of the Tibetan Women’s Association (TWA) told me that,
following the March 10 announcement, her organization
had asked the Dalai Lama to retain his leadership as they
considered his complete retirement to be a political step
too big for the Tibetan community.9 Yet, with the smooth
transition to the elected leadership over 2011-2012, she
said that TWA now accepts the change.

Indeed the emergence of secularization in the form of
institutional differentiation does not mean that religious
influence is declining in the Tibetan polity. In fact, the
explicit project of democratization draws on Buddhist
principles. This is evident in Article 2 of the 1963 Draft
Constitution,13 which emphasized the principle of chösi
sung drel by declaring Tibet to be a “unitary democratic
State founded upon the principles laid down by the Lord
Buddha.” It is frequently acknowledged that the monastic
order in Tibet, which became mired in conservatism and
ritualism, was very much bound up with the (undemocratic) Lhasa government (Jamyang Norbu 1990: 14; Boyd
2004: 33-34). It is nevertheless believed that the substance
of Buddhist teachings upholds ‘equality’ as an overarching
principle (Rinzin Thargyal 1997: 29). Indeed the principle
that “all human beings are essentially equal” and have an
“equal right to life, liberty and happiness” is what brings
the Dalai Lama to assert that Buddhism and democracy
are inherently compatible (Dalai Lama 1999a: 4; see also
Dreyfus 2002: 47-48). Thus, while there is a greater institutional differentiation between politics and religion in exile
compared to the Lhasa government, Buddhist discourse
continues to permeate exile Tibetans’ interpretations of
their political processes and institutions. There is no single
teleology to modernity (see Escobar 2008), and the Tibetans in exile are today evolving their own distinct brand of
secular modernity as an alternative to the political visions
asserted by the West as well as China. They are inspired
in part by the Indian model of secularism to reconcile
present-day political exigencies with their long-cherished
spiritual values.

The present day exile government differentiates between
the spheres of religion and the secular much more than in
the past. This can be viewed as a turn toward modernity
according to Weber, who sees the basic feature of modernity as the delineation of various spheres of value—religion,
politics, science, economy and so on (Weber 1962, 1968;
also see Latour 1993). The Ganden Phodrang government
in Lhasa had a sizeable ecclesiastical wing, with one half
of the government officials constituted by monks (Petech
1973: 7-8). In comparison, in exile, the administration of
religious affairs is confined to the responsibility of the
Department of Religion and Culture (one of the seven
departments of the CTA), and the number of monks employed in the government has been reduced to a handful
with the majority of the CTA employees now consisting
of laypeople. Furthermore, unlike the Lhasa aristocracy,
which patronized the three main Geluk monasteries (Goldstein 1968: 188), the CTA does not financially sponsor the
sangha.10
Even so, the differentiation between politics and religion
in the exile administration is by no means complete. Despite the Dalai Lama’s withdrawal of the Ganden Phodrang
from the CTA, institutional linkages remain in newly
configured forms, such as the Department of Religion and
Culture in the CTA, reserved seats for religious representatives in Parliament, and in certain remnant traditions like
the exile government’s consultation with the (unelected)
state oracle several times a year.11 Certainly, to the more
modern-minded Tibetans, “such appeals to non-rational
powers through mechanisms that would not be open to
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The 1991 Charter and Secularism
An ideology of Tibetan secularism is not only a product of
the philosophical deliberations of the Dalai Lama in works
such as Beyond Religion (2012) but something that has also
developed through political debate among the exile leadership. The 1963 Draft Constitution enshrined the principle
of the chösi sungdrel. Yet, this principle became discordant
over time because the 1963 document was drafted with
the idea of an immanent return to Tibet. The Charter for
the Tibetans-in-Exile, promulgated in 1991, revised the Draft
Constitution and was specifically designed for the exile

context. In a similar vein to its precursor, the Charter describes the exile government as a democratic welfare state
that aspires to “preserve their ancient traditions of spiritual and temporal life [chösi sungdrel], unique to the Tibetans,
based on the principles of peace and non-violence” (Tibet
Justice Centre 2012). However a key difference between the
Draft Constitution and the 1991 Charter is that whereas the
former explicitly referred to Buddhism, the latter does not
specify a particular religion as a referent for chö (religion/
spirituality).
Even though the term chösi sungdrel was adopted in the
1991 Charter, it is widely believed among CTA functionaries that in its structure and spirit, the Charter was in
fact secular in nature from its very inception14 since the
Charter’s earlier draft initially included the word ‘secularism’ (chöluk rimé) under the specific direction of the
Dalai Lama and the document was formulated on that
basis (Lobsang Sangay 2010: 297). When the draft came
before the parliament, however, the term chöluk rimé was
replaced by chösi sungdrel by majority vote. Yet, as the rest
of the document’s text and structure remained unchanged,
the purposive spirit of the Charter is still said to reflect
the principle of secularism, which, according to Samdhong
Rinpoche (the first democratically elected prime minister
in exile), means there cannot be any dominant influence
by any particular religion on the lawmaking process.15
Before turning to the parliamentary debate in 1991, it is
worth considering the etymology and connotations of the
two terms: chöluk rimé and chösi sungdrel. The former is
constituted by the words chö and luk meaning ‘religious
system’ and ri mé meaning ‘non-discrimination.’ Thus,
the Tibetan neologism for ‘secularism’ literally means
non-discrimination between religious systems. To fully
appreciate this term, however, one must also be aware
of the historical connotations of its key lexical constituent rimé, which denoted a non-sectarian and ecumenical
movement in nineteenth-century Eastern Tibet. Some of
the most influential proponents of the rimé tradition are
the nineteenth-century monk-scholars, Jamyang Khyentse
Wangpo, Jamgon Kontrul, Chokgyur Lingpa, and Mipham
Gyatso, who were active in the Kingdom of Dégé in Kham.
According to Smith, there were several characteristics that
marked the non-sectarian tradition as developed by these
scholars: a trend towards simplification, preservation of
minor lineages, a rejection of labels and a reorientation to
Indian classics as a way to “eliminate many controversies
that arose through variant expositions of the same text
by different Tibetan exegetes” (Smith 2001: 246). In this
way, rimé carries with it associations of non-sectarianism,
ecumenism, eclecticism and non-partiality (Gardner 2006:

112; Hartley 1997: 49), and thus the Tibetan term for ‘secularism’ is one that is premised in an acceptance of religious
pluralism.
Chösi zung drel, on the other hand, is a much older term
which literally means ‘religion and politics’ (chösi) ‘held
together’ (sungdrel) and is rendered variously as the union,
conjunction, or combination of religion and politics (see
Cüppers 2004). Under the Ganden Phodrang in Lhasa, the
chö in this term had meant nangchö (nang chos; Buddhism),
and chösi sungdrel had in fact implied a government under
the Geluk school of Tibetan Buddhism (see Ishihama 2004:
29-30). Historically speaking, therefore, chösi sungdrel was
less inclusive of religious diversity than rimé; but in the
Tibetan exile polity in the twenty-first century, these co cepts are now being refashioned.
At the parliamentary debate in 1991 on whether the words
chösi sungdrel or chöluk rimé should be upheld in the Charter, those who supported the former won by four votes,
led by the monk deputy Tsering Phuntsok. The grounds of
their arguments are summarized by Lobsang Sangay (2010:
297):
(1) Buddhism is an integral part of our life; whatever we do in life we consult divinations and perform
religious services for its success. Even the exile government performs trinchols [offerings] and asks for
advice from the Two Red and Black Protectoresses
[state oracles] or Buddhist deities for major activities. If we have a secular system, what will happen
to our official oracles? Where are we going to keep
them? (2) When making any decisions, if leaders
have to think about Buddhist philosophy and karma, there is less chance of corruption, unlike the
practice in other countries that are solely guided
by politics. Those who believe in religion will be
motivated to engage in good activities because his
religion tells him that he will earn merits if he does
such things. Since China does not have religion,
there is corruption, dishonesty, and oppression.16
In this way, the driving arguments behind those who supported chösi sungdrel in the parliamentary debate were the
defense of religious elements within traditional Tibetan
government and the perceived risk of moral corruption
if the Tibetans were to exclude religion from politics in a
manner similar to the brand of secularism under Chinese
communism. These arguments resonate with the Tibetans’
desire to reflect their own cultural identity upon their
political institutions—something that has not happened
for Tibetans in China. Further, according to Samdhong Rinpoche, the deputies in this camp felt that if the term chöluk
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rimé was adopted, then gradually Buddhist representation
in the parliament would be done away with and there
would be a decline of Tibetan ‘religious culture’ as a result
of dwindling state support for religious activities.17
On the other side of the parliamentary debate were the
Dalai Lama and Samdhong Rinpoche, who favored the
inclusion of the outvoted term of chöluk rimé. Some indication of the Dalai Lama’s thinking on this issue can be
discerned from his speech to the eleventh parliament on
29 May 1991:
We have used the word ‘secularism’ in our draft
charter. Experts interpret this word differently. But
in our charter the word is defined in Tibetan as rimé
(it roughly means that the state will not discriminate among different religions). However, nonviolence and peace, as I said earlier, are the essence of
religion. What I normally think is that the concept
of re-birth and a future life, and so on, as we have
in Buddhism, may not be acceptable to all religions.
However, I feel that all religions do believe in the
innate goodness of human beings and that different
religions exist to develop and strengthen this quality. Therefore, if our constitution is built on this principle,
it, for all practical purposes, incorporates the essence of
all religions, whether we give it the name of religion
or not. However, if we use the word religion, we
will be narrowing the scope of this constitution.
On the contrary, if we use the phrase “natural and
innate spiritual qualities of human beings,” it will
embrace the whole of humanity. Therefore from
this point of view also, it will ensure the dovetailing
of spiritual and secular values. As opposed to other
democracies, our democracy will have nonviolence
and peace at its roots, which means we will have a
government based on, as we often say, the combination
of spiritual and temporal values. When we see this word
‘secularism’ in any constitution, it sounds very appropriate and good. In our case, also, it is something which we
should seriously consider (Dalai Lama 1991: 7, emphasis added).
In the excerpt above, the Dalai Lama refers to both chösi
sungdrel and rimé favorably, which seems to confound the
parliamentary debate that treated them as alternatives.
Yet in this apparent paradox lies the key to understanding
how the ideology of Tibetan secularism or chöluk rimé is
being constructed and advocated.
As Samdhong Rinpoche told me, while there are many different interpretations of the English word ‘secular,’ which
may mean ‘absence of religion’ or even ‘anti-religion,’ the
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connotation encapsulated in chöluk rimé is “to give equal
respect to all religions and also equal respect to nonbelievers.”18 He explains that despite the insertion of chösi
sungdrel in the Charter, institutional separation between
religion and government can be ensured since the Charter
does not define religion or chö.
In the Charter, nowhere is there any definition of
chö: what is religion…Only the word ‘dharma’ is
mentioned, but what dharma?...It cannot be interpreted as Buddhism, but as the dharma of the chösi
sungdrel. So among the Tibetan people, we have
the Christians and we have Muslims, and we have a
few non-believers. So in that way if somebody asks
you, what is your chö, what is your dharma, in the
‘combination’ [in the concept of chösi sungdrel] in
the Charter, no one can properly, legally interpret
it. It may refer to all religions. So in that way, it is
not much different from chöluk rimé.19
It is evident from these words of the Dalai Lama and Samdhong Rinpoche that they do not advocate the identific tion of any one religion with a democratic government;
and yet there appears to be a view that the “essence of all
religions” or the “natural and innate spiritual qualities of
human beings,” as the Dalai Lama puts it (1991: 7), should
guide government action. Alluding to a body of values that
are common to, but simultaneously transcend, individual religions, the Dalai Lama and Samdhong Rinpoche see
scope for reconciling chösi sungdrel with chöluk rimé within
the context of the Charter.
From a Western view of secularism, it would be highly
counter-intuitive, even contradictory, to say that the
‘union of religion and politics’ is compatible with ‘secularism.’ However, this is made possible in the Tibetan understanding due to the essentialization of chö in the concept
of chösi sungdrel and the meanings of non-sectarianism and
ecumenism infused into the Tibetan notion of secularism.
Nevertheless it should be noted that the interpretation of
chösi sungdrel in the context of the Charter is qualitatively
different from chösi sungdrel as previously institutionalized
in Ganden Phodrang’s rule over central Tibet, and arguably
some slippage in the meaning of chö has taken place. While
the chö in chösi sungdrel had undoubtedly spelt ‘Buddhism’
under the Ganden Phodrang government in Lhasa, today
chö is interpreted liberally to mean spirituality in general.
In this way, even though the 1991 Charter enshrines the
words chösi sungdrel and thereby appeases the supporters of political tradition, institutional differentiation of
religion and politics, and the government’s freedom from
the dominant sway of any one religion are principles that

underlie the interpretation of the Charter as asserted by
the leaders who have occupied the highest echelons of
government in exile.
The ideology of Tibetan secularism as expounded by the
advocates of chöluk rime strongly bears the influence of
India’s model of secularism. In fact, in Beyond Religion,
the Dalai Lama makes a grateful attribution to India for
providing the preferred model of secularism for Tibetans
to follow (Dalai Lama 2012: 2-3) since this model upholds “a
profound respect for and tolerance toward all religions” as
well as “an inclusive and impartial attitude which includes
non-believers” (Dalai Lama 2012: 6-9). This understanding
of secularism clearly has the merit of maintaining unity
among the different religious and sectarian affiliations
within the Tibetan struggle; however it also has the advantage of winning the support and approval of India, the host
country for the majority of the exiled Tibetans, and the
country which has had the most proximate influence on
the political development of the CTA.
Secularism as an ideology that affirms religious pluralism
(while accepting non-believers) is further strengthened by
the concept of rimé in the Tibetan neologism for ‘secularism,’ which makes a historical allusion to Dégé where the
royal court maintained relations with multiple Buddhist
traditions, in contrast to Ganden Phodrang which was
dominated by the Geluk sect. It might even be said that
the religious policy of the exile administration that strives
to give equal representation to different monastic schools
through reserved seats in the parliament is in fact closer to
the policy of the Dégé court than to the Ganden Phodrang
in Lhasa. Even in the starkly different context of exile, rimé
is asserted as a solution to sectarian conflict (Gardner 2006:
xii), and the concept is now invoked as an ideology of solidarity that pervades both political and religious discourses,
calling for unity within the diversity of Tibetan society to
include those of different religious affiliation and of no
religion.
Secularization as Transfer and Transition of Political
Legitimacy
The second sense in which I deem secularization to be
taking place in the Tibetan exile polity is the transfer and
transition of political legitimacy. Specifically, I refer to
the transfer of the Dalai Lama’s political authority to the
elected leadership, and the transition in the very nature
of political legitimacy in Tibetan society from traditional-charismatic authority to democratic and legal-rational
legitimacy.20 Though interlinked, I distinguish between
transfer and transition, because the former suggests a shift
in the holder of authority whereas the latter denotes a

qualitative change in the very basis of legitimacy. Taking
Weber’s theory of legitimacy as my point of departure,21
I analyze secularization in terms of the occurrence of
both in the exile polity. In this section, I also discuss how
the two elected exile prime ministers to date have invoked traditional as well as legal-rational and democratic
authority to appeal to both their Tibetan constituents and
international supporters, all the while offering the model
of political development achieved in exile as an alternative
to Chinese rule in Tibet.
The moral authority of the institution of the Dalai Lama
is situated on a traditional-charismatic continuum, the
precise location of which is fluid and context-dependent.
In some historical periods, the incumbent Dalai Lama’s
legitimacy rests more on traditional authority, characterized by an “established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions” (Weber 1968: 215, 241-242) and determined
by time-honored rules and practices; in other periods, it
is more charismatic, relying on “a certain quality of an
individual personality” by virtue of which he is considered
extraordinary and exceptional (Weber 1968: 215, 241-242).
Weber says that even where charisma has been “routinized” and subsumed into traditional or bureaucratic forms
of rule, an “extraordinary event”—which would presumably include the circumstances that led to the exile of
Tibetans—can activate the dormant “revolutionary force”
of charisma (Weber 1968: 245, 1132 & 1134).
Although the Dalai Lama’s legitimacy is sourced in a
mixture of traditional and charismatic authority, as he
devolved his temporal powers to an elected leadership,
gradually legitimacy in exile has come to assume more
characteristics of legal-rational authority, based on a belief
in the right of those elevated to authority under the legality of rules (Weber 1968: 215, 241-242). This turn towards
the procedural integrity of political legitimacy is also what
marks a shift towards secular democracy in the exile society. I consider secularization in this sense to be ‘incipient’
because despite the signs of burgeoning democratic participation and the growing importance of modern political
processes, the two elected prime ministers to date have
continued to invoke traditional-charismatic authority in
some form given its tenacious hold on Tibetan society. The
current prime minister, for instance, has explicitly claimed
to have “both traditional and democratic legitimacy”
(Lobsang Sangay 2011a), asserting a historical continuity
of moral authority to appeal to the Tibetan populace, while
simultaneously using his democratic credentials to provide
a counterpoint to China. The ‘transition’ towards legal-rational legitimacy is thus not complete but the trend is
unmistakably towards one of secular democracy.
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The first elected prime minister in the Tibetan exile co munity was Samdhong Rinpoche, a tulku (sprul sku) or reincarnate lama who was enthroned as the reincarnation of
the fourth Samdhong Rinpoche at the Geluk monastery of
Gaden Dechenling (Samdhong Rinpoche and Roebert 2006:
xxi). He won the first-ever direct prime ministerial ele tions in exile in 2001 with an overwhelming majority of
84.54 percent of the ballot and was re-elected for a second
term in 2006 with 90 percent of the vote. In an interview
with Nepal-based Himal magazine, he commented in 2002
that, “From the feedback from people who voted for me I
gather they trust me not to disobey his Holiness. Therefore
they have not chosen me as a great democratic leader but have
chosen me as a faithful follower of His Holiness” (Tibetan Bulletin
2002 Jul-Sept: 22, emphasis added). These words appearing
in a magazine that covers news from the South Asian region may be taken as the first elected prime minister’s way
of appealing to the Tibetan diaspora in the region—particularly in Nepal where there is a large Tibetan community—
in assuring this constituent that they can expect him to act
in accordance with the will of the Dalai Lama.
As an avowedly “faithful follower” of the Dalai Lama, and
a high lama of the Geluk school of Tibetan Buddhism,
Samdhong Rinpoche represents a political leader whose legitimacy rests somewhere between the traditional-charismatic authority embodied by the Dalai Lama and a modern
democratic mandate yielded by the election process (see
also Kauffman 2011: 149). Samdhong Rinpoche’s leadership thus occupies a space of political liminality, a stage of
transition between the old and the new bases of legitimacy. Indeed, he draws on both spheres of moral authority in
his speeches as illustrated by the following statement on
Tibetan democracy:
The model of Tibetan democracy is fundamentally
different from the modern democratic principles.
Ours is based on basic principles of equality of
all sentient beings on the basis of their potential
of unlimited development. Such equality can be
established in the day to day living only through
cooperation and not through competition. Competition invariably leads to a form of confrontation
or struggle. Love and equality cannot be achieved
through competition… Realizing the phenomena of
human behavior, the Buddha had recommended a
democracy free from sense of competition (Samdhong Rinpoche 1996: 50).
These words, which were delivered in English at the Second International Conference of Tibet Support Groups in
1996, unapologetically glide across political and religious
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discourses to assert a uniquely Tibetan model of democracy, and are noteworthy because they demonstrate the
transitioning of political legitimacy in process. Further,
given the nature of his audience there (Tibet support
groups), it was likely that both references to democracy
and to Tibetan culture and religion were well-received.
By contrast, Lobsang Sangay, who became the second
elected exile prime minister in 2011 at the age of 43, represents the new generation of the Tibetan diaspora. Unlike
many other exile leaders of an older generation, he was
born and raised in India, and later went to the USA on a
Fulbright fellowship to undertake doctoral studies at Harvard Law School. During my field research, those outside
political circles (such as university students, nursing home
residents, sweater-sellers,22 and members of a women’s organization) frequently referred to Lobsang Sangay’s youth
and vigor as reasons for supporting him in the elections.
These references run parallel to a concern for the Dalai
Lama’s old age and the exile community’s political future.
As one woman explained why she had voted for the Harvard graduate: “We can show that we have a young leader
like Lobsang Sangay to the Chinese government and that
our struggle still continues.”23 In this way, Lobsang Sangay
came onto the exile political scene as a source of new ideas
and energy, but also as a force who would reinvigorate an
old struggle.
The prime ministerial elections in 2011 were the elections
that attracted by far the most interest among the Tibetan
diaspora to date. The elections held a special significance
for the exile community in that it occurred in the same
year as the Dalai Lama’s devolution of his political powers,
a large share of which would flow to the newly elected
prime minister. The final round of the polling occurred on
20 March 2011, just days after the Dalai Lama’s announcement of his retirement. In the end, Lobsang Sangay won
with 27,051 out of 49,189 votes (55 percent of the ballot)
while the other candidates Tethong Tenzin Namgyal (former appointed prime minister prior to the commencement
of direct prime-ministerial elections in 2001) received
18,405 votes, and former Minister Tashi Wangdi, 3,173
votes (Tibetan Review May 2011a: 6).
The increased political engagement and participation of
the exile community in the 2011 elections is also evident
from the number of registered24 and actual voters for the
three prime ministerial elections since 2001 (see Table 1).25
There appears to be a commonly shared view that, had
the electoral rules allowed Samdhong Rinpoche to run
for a third term, he would have enjoyed an easy victory.26
However, because of the rule against a prime minister’s

Year

Number of
registered voters

Number of actual
voters

Actual voters as a percentage
of registered voters

2001

67,376

35,184

52%

2006

72,000

32,205

44%

2011

82,000

49,184

60%

incumbency for a third consecutive term and the absence
of an inevitable favored candidate for the 2011 elections,
there was widespread interest as to who would win the
elections.
This interest was fanned by the new campaign style
that Lobsang Sangay introduced to the exile community. Sangay, who visited Tibetan diaspora communities
in thirty countries and in remote settlements of India,
acknowledged that he had approached the elections in
a very different way than previous candidates (Lobsang
Sangay 2011a). Until then, exile elections featured neither
pre-election debate nor campaign visits and had “been
dominated by cultural values which promote humility
and regard self-promotion negatively” (McConnell 2011a:
4). However, the 2011 elections, which saw 17 rounds of
pre-election debates (see pictures27 below), proved to be
very different. As the General Secretary of the Tibetan
Youth Congress (TYC) recalls:
I can say that I have been in the struggle for many
years, since I was 21 or 22 you know…I’ve seen
things over the many years, how the elections have
always been done...With the current Kalon Tripa
[prime ministerial] elections, Lobsang Sangay, I
think because of the way he is and the fact that
he has lived abroad and went to Harvard and he
has seen how things are done; he really went all
out with the whole campaign thing. That was very
interesting and a bit of a shocker I guess for many
traditional Tibetan people… You know he actually
did the campaign trail…[H]e visited settlements
from north to south, east to west, and abroad. You
name it, where the Tibetan communities were, he
went and spoke. He did the whole nine yards really,
if not more. And that really made the other candidates also move…We heard that Tenzin Namgyal
la [Tethong] told [Lobsang Sangay] that “You’re
making me go” because now he should be seen that
he is doing the campaign, right?… And people were
interested. They wanted to know the preliminary
results, they wanted to know who their candidates

Table 1: Registered and Actual
Voters at the Prime Ministerial
Elections 2001-2011.

were, it really rocked this community in exile. It was
such a high adrenaline kind of phase, this whole
pre-election and the pre-preliminaries (interview
with Tenzin Chokey, General Secretary of the TYC
Central Executive Committee).28
From the account of this civil society leader, the energy
and enthusiasm generated by the 2011 prime ministerial elections was novel and palpable, indicating an active
engagement from below which suggests that the change in
the nature of political legitimacy was not solely an initiative from above. As one of the students in my focus group29
commented, these elections constituted the “biggest
improvement in democracy so far.”30 It is also significant
that the three final prime ministerial candidates were all
laymen, which, together with the political retirement of
the Dalai Lama, signaled a decisive shift away from politics
where monks had dominated the highest positions in the
government.
Lobsang Sangay had in fact taken a course on political
campaigning at Harvard Kennedy School in preparation
for the elections; though he told me that he had attempted
to find a middle ground between his Western training and
what would be acceptable by Tibetan cultural standards,
which place a premium on humility.31 According to him, he
had to take care not to appear “too Americanized” or “too
aggressive … which is not so appreciated in the Tibetan
community” and thus resolved to “campaign without
campaigning and ask for votes without saying” (Lobsang
Sangay 2011a).
Lobsang Sangay has been careful not to disregard the traditional foundations of political legitimacy in Tibetan society. After winning the elections, he stated that although
the Dalai Lama devolved his temporal powers, there is
“continuation of the same political leadership” (Lobsang
Sangay 2011c) and finds support for this claim in the fo lowing words of the Dalai Lama on August 8, 2011, the day
he was inaugurated as prime minister: “When I was young,
an elderly regent Takdrag Rinpoche handed over sikyong
(political leadership) to me, and today I am handing over
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Sikyong to young Lobsang Sangay . . . in doing this I have
fulfilled my long-cherished goal” (Lobsang Sangay 2011b).
Lobsang Sangay elaborated:
[T]hat is a very important historical statement
because since 1642 till August 8th the political
authority rested with the institution of the Dalai
Lama, both spiritual [and] political. From the Fifth
Dalai Lama onwards through the 6th, 7th, and 8th,
the transition continued till 8th August. Therefore
when he said I am handing over political leadership
to young Lobsang Sangay he was handing over the
political authority of the institution of Dalai Lama to the
Kalon Tripa [prime minister], it is the continuation of
history, the continuation of the same political authority
of the 369 years old institution of the Dalai Lama (Lobsang Sangay 2011c, emphasis added).
Referring to the emblems of traditional authority in Tibetan society, Lobsang Sangay points to the transference
of the seal of the seventh Dalai Lama (established in 1751
in Tibet) from the former prime minister to himself and
explains this as signifying that “the same political authority established by the 7th Dalai Lama continue[s] with
me, the same legitimacy … continue[s] with me” (Lobsang
Sangay 2011c). Lobsang Sangay’s assertion of the continuity of traditional legitimacy is doubtlessly directed at the
majority of Tibetans who remain loyal to the Dalai Lama in
a bid to channel their political support to him. The English
translation of this speech appearing on the website of the
CTA suggests that this continuity is also something he
wishes the international community to recognize, possibly
in an indirect entreaty for continued assistance to the exile
community despite the political retirement of the Dalai
Lama who had garnered extensive support abroad.
On the other hand, Lobsang Sangay has laid great emphasis on his modern democratic mandate. He has repeatedly
burnished his democratic credentials by highlighting
that the government of the Tibet Autonomous Region is
not elected, and that therefore he enjoys greater political
legitimacy even if the prime ministerial elections in exile
were not able to fully include the Tibetans inside Tibet
(Lobsang Sangay 2011a; 2011b). By drawing attention to his
legal-rational and democratic authority, Lobsang Sangay
appeals internationally to the ‘free’ world, and simultaneously asserts a critique of, and alternative to, Chinese rule
in Tibet.
Thus, the new prime minister claims to have “both traditional and democratic legitimacy” (Lobsang Sangay 2011a)
and in so doing, he links his exile leadership to the Tibet-
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ans inside Tibet in two ways. First, by asserting traditional
legitimacy, he highlights the historical continuity of moral
authority that lay with the past governments of the Dalai
Lamas inside Tibet. Second, by pointing to his popular
mandate (however incomplete), he directs attention to
the absence of democratic legitimacy on the part of the
communist authorities inside Tibet. With the Dalai Lama,
who enjoys undisputed loyalty from the Tibetan people,
now removed from the political scene, Lobsang Sangay has
been at pains to emphasize his own legitimate standing
among the Tibetans at large. For example, he points out
that even though the Tibetans inside Tibet were not able to
physically participate in the voting process, they demonstrated their solidarity in various ways, such as by sending
him white scarves from Tibet or by praying at monasteries,
lighting butter-lamps and setting off firecrackers on Ele tion Day (Lobsang Sangay 2011a, 2011b).
Yet despite the invocations of historical continuity, it
should be noted that the new prime minister’s popular
appeal is premised much more in his democratic legitimacy than in a straightforward transfer of the Dalai Lama’s
traditional-charismatic authority—whatever Lobsang
Sangay’s claims to that authority may be. The Dalai Lama’s own foregrounding of Lobsang Sangay’s democratic
credentials (as a result of the election process) in his
statements of endorsement attests to this. In fact, after the
Dalai Lama’s congratulatory speech at the prime ministerial inauguration on 8 August 2011 when he used the term
‘sikyong’ in relation to the transfer of powers to Lobsang
Sangay, the exile parliament unanimously adopted a resolution on 20 September 2012 to change the official title
for the prime minister from ‘kalon tripa’ (chief of cabinet)
to ‘sikyong’ (political leader) (Phayul 2012). The change
implies an effort to clarify and confine the nature of the
authority that was conferred on the new prime minister
strictly to the political sphere.
It is also worth recognizing that the new prime minister
constitutes a very different object of loyalty and legitimacy
to what the Tibetans have been used to. Despite Lobsang
Sangay’s allusions to religious principles and symbols
in his political speeches, he does not have the religious
training nor bearing that his predecessors brought to their
roles. Besides being a layperson, as a legal scholar trained
in the United States, he has thoroughly imbibed the principles of modern secular political thought and this disposition is plain from his academic work (see for example
Lobsang Sangay 2003, 2004, 2010).32 His coming to power
serves to accentuate as well as accelerate the emergent
secularization in exile.

Conclusion
To a large extent, the construction of Tibetan democracy
and secularism has been a project imposed from above and
in response to an international community of sponsors.
Much of it can be traced to the efforts of the present Dalai
Lama to democratize and modernize the exile polity and
promote inter-sectarian unity. Yet the Dalai Lama’s secular
ideology has not remained arcane, and my field research
revealed its internalization, to varying degrees, by different segments of the Tibetan community. I have argued in
this paper that unfolding in tandem with the evolution of
a Tibetan secularism is a process of secularization in exile.
Tracing the history of the Dalai Lama’s democratic reforms
reveals that the withdrawal of his temporal powers from
the government was gradual but deliberate. From the abolition of the traditional diarchic system to the incremental
devolution of his own temporal authority, at every stage,
the Tibetan leader displayed judiciousness as he worked to
extricate the intertwinement of religion and politics that
characterized traditional Tibetan governance to institutionally separate the two spheres.
I have also maintained that secularization in the form of
a transfer and transition of political legitimacy has taken
place with the devolution of the Dalai Lama’s temporal
powers to the elected leadership and the changes in the
foundations of political legitimacy from traditional-charismatic authority to legal-rational authority and democratic
constitutionalism. This transition is by no means complete.
Social discourses in exile continue to waver between the
new and the old bases of legitimacy or at times draw on
both. Nevertheless, the degree of participation in and
enthusiasm for the democratic process displayed by the
Tibetan diaspora in the 2011 prime-ministerial elections
suggests that there is a discernible shift from legitimacy
based on the sovereignty of the Dalai Lama as a Bodhisattva-King to one grounded in popular sovereignty.
Democratization and secularization are not only processes
to politically develop the exile society but also strategies to
enhance the credibility of the Tibetans’ national struggle
in the eyes of the international community as well as their
host country India, often described as the world’s largest democracy. By evolving a secularism that looks upon
religion positively (and one that is also tolerant of the
non-religious), the Tibetan exiles declare that they can be
modern and religious, secular and spiritual as they take
their national struggle and self-understanding into the
twenty-first century
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Endnotes
1. I conducted fieldwork from 29 June to 29 September
2012 in the state of Himachal Pradesh, India. For the most
part, I stayed in Dharamsala because the hill-station serves
as an ‘exile capital’ where most Tibetan civil society and
media organizations are based. However, I also spent a
fortnight in Bir, a few hours away from Dharamsala, to
witness life in a Tibetan settlement. During the course of
my research, I conducted 53 semi-structured interviews, 21
informal interviews, 4 focus group discussions and spoke
to numerous others in a conversational capacity (what I
refer to as ‘personal communications’).
2. Some work on secularization in this first sense has been
done by Brox (2012).
3. The closest to my usage of secularization in this
second sense is probably the theory of Weber himself,
which argues that societies become ‘disenchanted’ (that
is, move away from their magical ‘enchanted’ worlds) as
they modernize and transition to a system dominated by
bureaucracy and legal-rational authority (Weber 1946,
1962, 1968). Yet, although I borrow from Weber the notion
of secularization as involving a transition in the nature of
legitimate authority, I stop short of claiming that this has
brought about ‘disenchantment’ or a decline in religious
authority (see Chaves 1994).
4. These include the right to approve bills passed by the
exile parliament, promulgate acts and ordinances, and
dissolve the parliament.
5. Semi-structured interview with nun from Dolma Ling
Nunnery (anonymous), 27 September 2012.
6. This is a Sanskrit word (lit. ‘wheel-turner’) that
indicates a universal Buddhist sovereign who is sometimes
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presented as the temporal counterpart to the Buddha
(Ruegg 2003: 366).

19. Semi-structured phone interview with Samdhong
Rinpoche, former exile Prime Minister, 26 January 2013.

7. He elaborates that the “Ganden Phodrang [is] reverting
back to its role and responsibility as being the spiritual
head as during the time of the second, third and fourth
Dalai Lamas” (CTA 2011, 24). Accordingly, the CTA has
changed its Tibetan name from bö zhung gan den po drang
chok lé nam gyel (Bod gzhung dga’ ldan pho brang phyogs las
rnam rgyal ‘the victorious Ganden Phodrang government’)
to ü bö mé trik dzuk (dbus bod me’i sprig ‘dzugs ‘Tibetan
people’s central organization’)—the implication being
that, along with his political powers, the Dalai Lama has
withdrawn his institution (Ganden Phodrang) from the
exile administration.

20. Max Weber famously advanced his taxonomy of the
three types of legitimate domination comprising legalrational authority based on a belief in the legality of rules
and the “right of those elevated to authority under such
rules to issue commands”; traditional authority, which rests
on an “established belief in the sanctity of immemorial
traditions and the legitimacy of those exercising authority
under them”; and charismatic authority, deriving from
“a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue
of which he is considered extraordinary and treated as
endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least
specifically exceptional powers or qualities” (Weber 1968:
215, 241-242). Weber maintains that these are ideal types
that rarely exist in their pure form, and that in actuality,
the three are combined in various ways (Weber 1968: 216).

8. Personal communication from foreign visitor present
at the March 10 ceremony in 2011 when the Dalai Lama
publicly announced the complete devolution of his
political powers, 2 July 2012; also see Bhuchung Sonam
2012: 123.
9. Semi-structured interview with Tashi Dolma, President
of Tibetan Women’s Association, 27 July 2012.
10. Semi-structured interview with Pema Chhinjor,
Minister for Religion and Culture, 1 August 2012.
11. Semi-structured interview with Pema Chhinjor,
Minister for Religion and Culture, 1 August 2012; Semistructured interview with Nechung oracle, 10 September
2012.
12. Personal communication from employee of Supreme
Justice Commission (anonymous), 20 September 2012.
13. This is a document which was designed for
implementation upon the exiles’ return to Tibet with the
approval of the majority of Tibetans.
14. Semi-structured interview with Pema Chhinjor,
Minister for Religion and Culture, 1 August 2012; Informal
interview with Jampal Chosang, Election Commissioner, 29
August 2012.
15. Semi-structured phone interview with Samdhong
Rinpoche, former exile Prime Minister, 26 January 2013.
16. Note, however, that there is no proven correlation
between religious influence upon a government and its
lack of corruption.

21. I am not the first to draw on Weber to study the
position of the Dalai Lama. Jane Ardley makes a brief
mention of the Dalai Lama’s ‘charismatic authority’ and
how its routinization through the democratization process
has combined charisma with legal-rational domination
(Ardley 2002: 86). Further, Lobsang Sangay (2004) has, in
his previous life as an academic before he became exile
prime minister, referred to Weberian theory in examining
the charismatic authority of the institution of the Dalai
Lama and its historical incumbents. There are also
others who have applied Weber’s taxonomy of the three
types of legitimate authority to the previous Dalai Lama
incarnations (Smith 1996: 99; Dreyfus 1995; Michael 1982;
French 1995). The ready applicability of Weber’s theory
is not surprising given that Weber himself discusses the
institution of the Dalai Lama numerous times in Economy
and Society (1968) as an instance of charismatic authority.
However, I propose a more extended application of Weber
compared to existing works in that, rather than only
focusing on the institution of the Dalai Lama, I also employ
Weber’s taxonomy in relation to the Dalai Lama’s transfer
of authority to the elected leadership and the transition in
the very nature of legitimacy that is taking place in exile,
which I link to the process of secularization.
22. This is an exile appellation for the large numbers of
Tibetans who engage in ‘winter business’ where wholesale
ready-made garments are bought from factories (not just
sweaters) and retailed along the roadside in different
towns and cities (Thilpa Tenzin Sherab 2011: 11).

17. Semi-structured phone interview with Samdhong
Rinpoche, former exile Prime Minister, 26 January 2013.

23. Focus group discussions with three Regional Tibetan
Women’s Association (RTWA) members (two sweater
sellers and one street vendor), 4 August 2012.

18. Semi-structured phone interview with Samdhong
Rinpoche, former exile Prime Minister, 26 January 2013.

24. To be eligible to vote, the Tibetans must be 18 and over
and must hold a ‘Green Book’, which can be obtained only
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through payment of the voluntary ‘freedom tax’ to the CTA
(McConnell 2009a: 346-347; McConnell 2011a: 3). Further to
vote, the Green Book must be registered prior to the actual
voting on Election Day.
25. These figures are compiled from Lobsang (2011a) and
figures received from the CTA Election Commissioner
(informal interview with Jampal Chosang, Election
Commissioner, 29 August 2012).
26. Semi-structured interview with Tenzin Chokey,
General Secretary of the Central Executive Committee,
Tibetan Youth Congress (TYC), 10 July 2012; semistructured interview with a sweater seller (anonymous), 27
July 2012.
27. These photos have been reproduced with the kind
permission of Chime Youngdung, Director of Tibet Support
Office and former president of the National Democratic
Party of Tibet (NDPT).
28. Semi-structured interview with Tenzin Chokey,
General Secretary of the Central Executive Committee,
Tibetan Youth Congress (TYC), 10 July 2012.
29. Focus groups are a type of ‘group interview’ requiring
greater facilitation by the interviewer to manage more
than one interviewee. The method is useful for eliciting
multiple views and showing how participants in a group
interact with one another. This focus group session,
conducted on 24 July 2012, involved three Tibetan
university students living in India.
30. Focus group discussion with three university students,
24 July 2012.
31. Semi-structured interview with Lobsang Sangay, exile
Prime Minister, 29 August 2012.
32. With unwitting historical irony, he wrote in 2003:
“[the Dalai Lama] must give way politically to a popularly
elected leader and let his office become a purely spiritual
one. There is no doubt that he enjoys the mandate of the
Tibetan people, but if he is to lead them to full democracy
must he not step aside and let a secular system flourish?”
(Lobsang Sangay 2003: 126). Lobsang Sangay’s own
political stance is evidently one that advocates for secular
leadership.
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